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Making War Thinkable*
SHIMON S. GOTTSCHALK
Florida State University
School of Social Work
This paper identifies significant cognitive elements in Western thought
which appear to undergird and lend an aura of legitimacy and credence
to discussions of defense, armaments, and the preparation of war.
The prospect of war among the major nations of the world
has become a mad man's nightmare, an absurd solution solving
everything, and nothing (Schell, 1982). In the event of nuclear
war, there will be no victors or losers; all will be victims. If not
all mankind, then all that is known as humanity is threatened
with extinction. War and the preparation for war depletes na-
tions' economies and wastes the world's resources.
Since war is a wild, suicidal absurdity, why do presumably
sane human beings persist in planning, and threatening such
an ultimate holocaust? What is it that continues to make nuclear
war thinkable among both governmental leaders and those who
willingly or passively support them? Erich Fromm (1955), has
interpreted this kind of collective behavior as a form of insanity.
Anthropologists have developed notions such as the territorial
imperative (Lorenz, 1966). The most prominent political scien-
tists call upon us to be realistic: the balance of terror is said to
prevent the very horror it portends. Alternatively, political/econ-
omists offer explanations that are based upon reconceptualiza-
tions of the class struggle and the dynamics of modern corporate
capitalism (O'Connor, 1973). Still others point to the attractive-
ness of the "game" of war (Fuller, 1984) or the pervasive power
and dramatic seductions of the media (Parenti, 1986).
The purpose of this paper is neither to challenge nor to
refute any of these explanations for the persistence of planful
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threats to human survival. Rather, the aim is to identify several
of the most significant cognitive elements in Western thought
which appear to undergird and lend an aura of legitimacy and
credence to discussions of defense, armaments, and the prepa-
ration of war. Three kinds of conceptualization, those related to
wealth, to truth, and to power, appear to be central to making
war thinkable. Each of these clusters of ideas are discussed
separately.
This paper pursues its analysis of the war mentality without
specific reference to important sociological, political, psycholog-
ical, or other theories because its focus is less on behaviors than
on ideas, and on the thinkability of war. The question is, what
are some of the meanings which have been incorporated into
our way of thinking which promote these dangerous behaviors?
Theories of society and of human behavior can explain much,
but they cannot fully explain themselves. That is why it is nec-
essary to dig beneath them. Every theory begins with a set of
culturally, historically, and politically based assumptions (Pop-
per, 1972).
In focusing on assumptions underlying some of the most
salient cognitive integers prevalent in the modern Western world
the aim is to uncover ideological biases. It is an explicit as-
sumption of the analytic approach which is here being under-
taken that human beings act intentionally, with meaning and
purpose. They do not simply behave mechanistically, like au-
tomatons responding to stimuli. Intentional action implies
thoughtful action, in this case, the thoughts and ideas that make
war and the preparation for war thinkable, creditable, and there-
fore possible.
Wealth-The Economics Paradigm
All economic goods are, by definition, scarce. When there
is no scarcity, there is no possibility of economic thinking in the
Western sense. Both the concept, and the empirical reality of a
market economy are made possible by the assumption that the
goods which are exchanged are desirable (needed or wanted)
and in limited supply. Thus, markets have become institution-
alized systems for the exchange of economic goods. Markets are
expected to function best when each of the actors behaves in a
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manner which maximizes his/her self interest.
As the major alternative (or supplement) to the market sys-
tem in the West, scarce and desired goods may be allocated by
a legitimate authority, such as a government, a social agency, or
a taxing authority. But also under this alternative allocational
system the fundamental assumptions of the dominant econom-
ics paradigm are usually maintained. Were there no scarcity, or
no demand, the maintenance of both markets and allocational
authorities would be redundant. Under both systems it is the
cognitively and normatively established view that demand, i.e.,
the desire to consume in theoretically unlimited quantity, scar-
city, and the promotion of self-interest are rational and inevi-
table. The hypothetical "economic man" (sic) behaves in
accordance with these strictures.
It is commonplace to assert that unlimited demand is arti-
ficially promoted in late capitalist societies and that this con-
sumerist orientation is being successfully exported to the elites
of both the socialist and the developing world. Not as commonly
accepted is the idea that scarcity, too, is a social construction,
a product of planful economic policy and of ideology.
Within the sphere of pragmatic economic policy both gov-
ernments and multinational corporations contrive a variety of
ways to limit production or to withold surpluses of, e.g., steel,
oil, and agricultural products (Barnet, 1980; Moore-Lappe, 1979).
Thus scarcities are planfully produced. In addition, and for pur-
poses of this discussion more importantly, scarcity in tandem
with unlimited demand is sustained as an ideology, a system
of belief which is purported to promote hard work, productiv-
ity, a sense of self worth, and other such virtues. It serves as a
justification for the persistence of poverty (there is not enough)
and a rationale for hard work (the need to increase productivity).
Even more important than the fact that scarcity induces the rais-
ing of prices and profits is its ideological significance. The belief
in the reality of scarcity lends essential institutibnal support to
the existing world economic hegemony and to the dominant
agencies of political control and economic coercioh, such as banks
and commodity markets.
The suggestion that the notfon of scarcity and unlimited de-
mand might be abandoned might appear, at first glance, to be
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a smug, middle class fantasy, one that has no place in the "real"
world of poverty, hunger and oppression. But twentieth century
poverty persists precisely because it is maintained by the eco-
nomics paradigm that is here being challenged. It is a system
that permits of the extremes of excessive wealth and abject pov-
erty. Or to say it differently, the social problem might be viewed
as one of excessive concentrations of wealth, rather than as one
of poverty. Barry Commoner (1971) and other ecologists have
been arguing for years that for the foreseeable future the earth
possesses sufficient material resources so that no one need live
in extreme want.
The focus on economic goods as the primary source of hu-
man welfare has had the effect of trivializing non-economic
goods which are not similarly subject to scarcity (Carse, 1987).
Freedom, love, creativity, knowledge, joy, the sense of purpose
and well being are all in unlimited supply. They are beyond
scarcity, beyond the constraints of the market and yet readily
perceived to be among the most significant "goods" that build
peace and promote human welfare (Schumacher, 1973). The ide-
ology associated with the economics paradigm has tended not
only to devalue these very human goods, but also in many in-
stances to commoditize them. They have thus been made scarce,
granted monetary value, and been subjected to the rules of the
market. Health has become medicine, love is a new sports car,
honor is purchased from a public relations firm, and security is
represented by bigger and better armaments.
The perpetuation of scarcity and unlimited demand within
the context of an excessively individualistic society (Bellah et al.,
1986; Dallmayr, 1981; Bell, 1987) has produced what Thurow
(1980) has aptly called, "the zero sum society". It is a society
which tends to define human relationships in economic terms
and thus promotes never ending competition for ostensibly scarce
resources among individuals and nations. When property rights
are elevated above all others (Helms, 1987), then war is made
thinkable and easily justifiable in the effort to maintain, or to
gain more economic wealth. It is not simply the existence of
vast inequalities in wealth that invite violent conflict. Rather, it
is the particular ideology which emphasizes, justifies, and leg-
itimizes these inequalities that make war thinkable. For an un-
just peace is but a respite between wars.
Making War Thinkable
The Claims of Truth
The search for certain truth is as old as the most ancient
religions. Claims to the discovery of truth have commonly been
associated with assertions of superiority, if not invincibility.
Truth is powerful, good, and virtuous.
Similar claims for truth have been made by Western empir-
ical science since the middle of the sixteenth century. Over a
period of four hundred years this truth and its prophets have
laid claim, with ever increasing success, to a superior method
of knowing. The idea has been nurtured that objective knowl-
edge is available to humankind. A specific method for the at-
tainment of such truth has been specified. Wheras for Aristotle
(Metaphysics, 982a) the search for true knowledge was conceived
as its own reward, with Francis Bacon the search for causes in
nature took a new turn. Prediction and control of events became
the goal of the new science and the dominant human interest
(Habermas, 1971). Especially since the nineteenth, and the first
part of the twentieth century, advance of this meaning of truth
was associated in the popular mind with normatively valued
progress.
There is no need to dwell here on the significant contribu-
tions of modem science and derivative technologies to human
betterment, on the one hand, and to warfare on the other. That
is not our issue. Rather, our concern is with the singular claims
of empirical science as the only truth, or the only path to truth.
Such a claim, if supported, has profound political implications:
it authorizes those who know, to dominate over nature, as well
as over all those who are condemned to ignorance. (Historically,
this has been known as the distinction between the saved and
the damned). The truth of modem empirical science which is
concerned primarily with the observable, measurable and func-
tional excludes and denigrates knowledge of the aesthetic, the
moral and the transcendental (Friedmann, 1979). A system of
knowledge which emphasizes doing over being and controlling
over understanding is one that tends to denude the world of its
enchantment and substantially robs it of its meaningfulness
(Moscivici, 1977). An approach to truth seeking which is ori-
ented toward the maximization of control is likely to be resisted
by persons who are thus controlled, made the passive objects of
another's knowledge, and expected to behave normatively in
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accordance with rules that are not of their own making.
These, and other criticisms of Western empirical science,
especially of social science, have gained an ever greater foothold
among philosophers of science during the past half century.
Much like any and all other ways of knowing, the Western sci-
entific enterprise is understood to be politically, culturally, and
ideologically bound to the status quo (Peller, 1987; Raskin and
Bernstein 1987; Bernstein, 1978; Capra, 1982). Not unsurpris-
ingly, it is seen as an ideology primarily protective of existing
political and social arrangements.
The most important criticism of modern scientism with re-
spect to the issue of making war thinkable is its principled re-
fusal to take into account the moral consequences of its claimed
truths. The segmentation of modem consciousness into the sep-
arate realms of reason and emotion, or thought and feeling (Ber-
ger and Kelner, 1973) has led to the separation of knowledge
from wisdom. The myth of an objective, value free modern sci-
ence is thereby secured. In the physical sciences this segmented
mentality has made possible rational thought about what might
otherwise be considered totally irrational means and ends. In
the social sciences it makes possible thinking about human per-
sons as depersonalized subjects. At times of social conflict they
are conceived variously (but always anonymously) as victims,
enemies, or body counts. It has led to what Hannah Arendt
(1962) called, the banality of evil, for it disvalues the kind of
reflexive and ideographic knowledge of self and others which
enables human beings to humanize each other. Dialogue and
mutual understanding have thus been undermined as essential
building blocks of knowledge and truth. Human conflict can be
readily justified by an ideology which presumptuously invali-
dates the truth of the other, perhaps even before it has been
heard.
Power and Authority
Despite the rhetoric of equality in both the capitalist and the
socialist West, the dominant social institutions in both societies
are invariably characteried by bureaucratically structured hier-
archies. Some persons and institutions are thus conceived as
being legitimately more powerful than others. They have au-
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thority which derives from the passive or active societal concen-
sus. Authority, defined as legitimate power, permits of the control
of the behavior of others, even if it is against their will. Au-
thority is built upon images of strength, suggests Richard Sen-
nett (1980). It derives from a quest for images that are solid,
guaranteed, and stable. As a consequence, it constitutes a source
of both security, and of threat.
Power and authority are enhanced by wealth and by claims
to specialized knowledge. But more basic than these two sources
of strength, is the complex pattern of sentiments and emotions
that grant legitimacy, especially to governments. People have
been taught to stand in awe of the actual or potential exercise
of great power. Power is good, is masculine, is invigorating, and
its maximization is a constantly desired goal. Even as we protest
against great power, we appear to admire it (Sennett, 1980). By
contrast, to be weak is to experience social contempt. In the
competition for power, the best are alleged to rise to the top; by
inference, the least worthy remain at the bottom. This kind of
a "rational" hierarchy is expected to promote competence, pro-
duce collective prosperity, and guarantee social order. (That it
at the same time produces failure and the sense among individ-
uals that they are inadequate is a less proudly recognized
consequence).
No doubt, some important psychic gains may be claimed
for the maintenance of traditional power structures (Fromm,
1952). But that is only one side of the issue. The exercise of
power, especially the power of governments, is easily associated
with the threat or the actual use of physical violence. Claims for
the legitimacy of such violence are based on a variety of rhe-
torical propositions: patriotism, justice, security, solidarity, dig-
nity, and ironically, peace.
War, and in its most extreme form, atomic war, is an exercise
of the power of the state wherein its legitimacy and its virtue
are tested to the limit. Governments can be viewed as those
institutions that have been permitted to arrogate unto them-
selves the ultimate authority to use violence for allegedly legit-
imate ends, as for example, in inflicting capital punishment, or
by declaring war. But the images upon which such exercise of
violence are built are tenuous. The capacity to make war relies
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not only on the rhetorical justification of the cause, but also on
the maintenance of received ideas of power, its virtue and good-
ness (Sharp, 1973).
Governments are unlikely to institutionalize the promotion
of peace because such action requires the unlikely voluntary
abrogation of their own power. Peace, especially a peace which
is greater than the absence of war, can therefore only come from
the bottom up, from people who delegitimize the use of physical
violence as a form of state power. It is not that they must con-
demn all use of power, rather that they need lay claim to a new
understanding of it, one that is other than coercive, controlling,
and ultimately violent.
There is a variety of paths toward the development of a new
understanding of power. It is possible to structure minimally
hierarchical institutions, and to reduce presently large differ-
entials in rewards between those who are at the bottom and
those who are at the top. Most uses of physical force as a method
of social control could be delegitimized, beginning with the
family and moving beyond to the larger society. Non-violent
resistence to what is viewed as illegitimate use of authority has
been effective more frequently than is generally recognized
(Sharp, 1973). Decentralization and the general down sizing of
human organizations holds important promise for the reduction
of depersonalization in the exercise of power (McRobie, 1981).
Most crucial, however, is the need to think critically about the
meaning of power and authority itself. Human differences in
capacity and ability are real. How can these differences be ac-
counted for so as to emphasize the essential core of human
equality? Rather than power which controls, a new understand-
ing of power might be one that nurtures, one that liberates the
less powerful from domination. The primary goal of such a lib-
eration would not be limited to the expansion of individual
rights, but would indude the maximization of liberty through
mutual responsibility and caring in a manner presumably shared
by many of the founders of the American republic (Bellah, et al.,
1985).
Summary and Conclusion
It is difficult, if not inappropriate, to write about matters of
war and peace without passion. There are those who would
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define knowledge as an objective, dispassionate search for truth.
They would be critical of both the substance and the style of
this paper. But theirs is not the truth that gives direction and
meaning to human lives. Does an ever increasing capacity to
consume more of the world's resources purchase the good life?
Does the always greater power which we seek for ourselves,
individually and collectively, provide the security which we seek?
Do the artificial scarcities enhance human creativity and guar-
antee progress in a manner that promotes justice? Or is it rather,
as the novelist Milan Kundera (1985) has suggested, "man thinks
and the truth escapes him"? Recalling Flaubert's historical vision
he summarizes, "stupidity does not give way to science, tech-
nology, modernity, progress, on the contrary, it progresses right
along with progress" (Kundera, 1985, p. 11).
Who would voluntarily choose poverty over wealth, igno-
rance over knowledge, weakness over power? These are the false
choices that have been offered to the people and the nations of
the world. The language, the concepts and the ideologies within
which they have been embedded must be challenged. Fortu-
nately, the floodgate of new ideas has begun to open (Capra,
1982; Dallmayr, 1981; Schumacher 1973; Raskin and Bernstein,
1987; Griffin, 1978; Toffier, 1980). Thoughtful analysis and cre-
ative invention are an essential antecedent to political action.
The prevention of nudear war is possible not only to the
extent that we organize, demonstrate in opposition, and refuse
to cooperate, but also to the degree that we can succeed in mak-
ing it unthinkable. Some will view all this as an unrealistic,
idealistic fantasy. Perhaps it is, but the animus for its expression
derives from the intimate awareness that the alternative fantasy
is too horrid to contemplate.
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